Group coordination is embedded in social networks, which aims to reach a consensus or solve conflicts among social individuals. Recently, improving performance has become a challenging task and drawn considerable interest in this field. To eliminate barriers of group coordination, we abstract the problem into a networked color coordination game and introduce learning agents encoded with Q-learning to collect local information and learn local individual behaviors. We first show that learning agents can effectively improve the group coordination performance. By properly selecting parameters, we find that learning agents acting with low greedy parameter levels and placed in central locations can drastically accelerate group coordination. Greedy parameters and positions are vital to the problem. Finally, we indicate that learning agents have a direct effect on neighbor individuals and an indirect effect on non-neighbor individuals to act on the coordination network. Moreover, we propose a conflict relationship index which is the average rounds required for solving conflicts and indicate learning agents solve conflicts that cannot be solved by an individual. Hence, learning agents create further benefits to group coordination in these complex social networks. This paper provides a detailed analysis of the learning agents in a networked color coordination game and shows that artificial intelligence provides a solution to the group coordination problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of network technology, social network platforms are being widely used as the carrier of competition and cooperation [1] . Therefore, improving competition and cooperation among intelligent individuals to satisfy the needs of society represents a challenging and fascinating focus area [2] , [3] . Because group cooperation requires the sacrifice of individual interests to achieve a higher overall interest [4] - [7] , it is often hard to achieve the maximum collective societal interest [8] . Additionally, individual ''blind'' phenomena, for example, decisions completed with limited information, make it difficult for individuals to weigh the relationship between individual interests and collective interests [7] , [9] , namely, the social dilemma [10] , [11] . However, even when the social dilemma can be solved, there remains another obstacle-group coordination. Groups often have difficulty achieving the maximum collective interest. The possible reasons for this problem include conflicting interests among individuals, conflicting interests between individuals The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Lin Wang . and their group, and the inability of individuals to effectively coordinate their actions globally [12] . Even if all individuals effectively coordinate with their neighbors, this may not result in the maximum collective interest for the group, which is a sub-optimization problem [11] , [13] - [15] . However, with the development of technology and the constantly deepening understanding of social systems, the complex group coordination problem can become manageable in society [16] , [17] .
To solve the group coordination problem and satisfy the needs of society, experts in various fields (including biologists, physicists, and psychologists) are focusing on this problem [18] . There exists many original and influential works in this field from the interdisciplines among statistical physics, network science, game theory and so on. Perc et al. [19] reviewed the evolutionary dynamics of group interactions on structured populations. Later, Perc et al. [20] reviewed the statistical physics research of human cooperation, focusing on spatial pattern formation, the spatiotemporal dynamics of observed solutions, and self-organization that may either promote or hinder socially favorable states. Besides, Wang et al. [21] highlighted the importance of pattern formation and collective behavior for promoting the cooperation under adverse conditions, as well as the synergy effects. In the application of human lives, Helbing et al. [22] showed that complexity science can mitigate the undesirable cascade effects and accelerate the emergence of favorable kinds of self-organization in the system. Within the field of control science and engineering, many works have emerged. Considering network structures, Enemark et al. [23] explained why the negative effect of constraint outweighs the positive effect of communication in complex coordination tasks. Rand et al. [24] provided an experimental demonstration of the power of a static network structure in stabilizing human cooperation, which is consistent with a quantitative evolutionary game theoretical prediction. In a more recent work, Enemark et al. [25] showed that connections can influence coordination in two different ways, wherein connections that reduce the number of solutions to a problem play a negative role in coordination and connections facilitate coordination. To improve this problem, Peysakhovich and Lerer [26] constructed consequentialist conditional cooperation in a large class of games that can construct good strategies by conditioning one's behavior solely based on outcomes using deep reinforcement learning techniques and demonstrated that the method is effective in social dilemmas beyond simple matrix games. Shirado and Christakis [12] researched the group coordination problem and discover a surprising solution, namely, that locally noisy agents improve global human coordination and help the group achieve the maximum collective interests. In the field of computer technology, this problem is often abstracted as a multi-agent problem in research. Salazar et al. [27] presented a distributed approach to coalition emergence in large-scale multiagent systems which achieves full cooperation over different complex networks. Peleteiro et al. [28] presented a new mechanism based on three main pillars (indirect reciprocity, coalitions and rewiring) to improve cooperation among self-interested agents placed in a reputation-based game. Shibusawa et al. [29] proposed a behavioral strategy called the expectation of cooperation, which is simple and easy to implement but, nevertheless, can spread over and maintain cooperation in agent networks under certain conditions. However, these studies are not applicable to solving the social dilemma of coordination in some agent networks, or they are not applicable to actual social systems.
According to the above research, if locally noisy agents improve global human coordination and help the group achieve the maximum collective interests, learning agents can bring about a better outcome. Artificial intelligence has recently arisen as a widespread theory, and it applies to many problems. In this paper, we introduce learning agents based on local information into a networked color coordination game and provide a solution to the group coordination problem. The major contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows.
1) We abstract the group coordination problem into a networked color coordination game [30] . Based on this model, we introduce learning agents (q-bots) encoded with Q-learning based on local information into the network in exchange for the same number of conventional agents. In addition, we design clear action rules for q-bots and conventional agents. We classify the conflicts into resolvable conflicts and unresolvable conflicts according to the action rules of conventional agents. 2) We carry out comparison experiments on the network with and without q-bots. By analyzing the comparison results, we find that the main cause of the group coordination problem is that conventional agents cannot reach the collective objective by eliminating only their local conflicts in the individual perception. In addition, we prove the effectiveness of q-bots in solving the group coordination problem. 3) To evaluate the effect of parameters on q-bots in solving the group coordination problem, we evaluate 10 conditions: 1 control condition without q-bots and 9 conditions that combine the greedy parameters and network locations of q-bots. In this experiment, we find that the greedy parameter and network location play an important role in solving the problem. We show that q-bots acting with low levels of greedy parameters placed in central locations meaningfully improve the group coordination by more than 80%. 4) To better understand the mechanism of q-bots in solving the group coordination problem, we carry out 2 experiments. We calculate the degree of node color change for every 100 generations in one experiment. Based on this experiment, we show that q-bots act on the coordination network by affecting not only neighbor individuals but also non-neighbor individuals. Then, we propose a conflict relationship index in which the average rounds required for solving conflicts and indicate q-bots eliminate conflicts that cannot be solved by individuals.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, a networked color coordination game model is presented to characterize group coordination. Based on this, in Section III, we introduce q-bots into the model and formulate the action rules of conventional agents and q-bots. To verify and explore the effectiveness of q-bots in solving the group coordination problem, numerical experiments are performed on a networked color coordination game case, and the results are presented in Section IV. Our conclusions and final discussion are provided in Section V.
II. GROUP COORDINATION MODEL
The group coordination problem is complex and unique in social networks. Therefore, to solve this problem, the abstracted and representative model is critical [31] . In this section, a networked color coordination game model is presented to characterize this problem.
Group coordination can be characterized by a networked color coordination game. The color coordination game is an
. , c k } shows the alternative colors and the sorted sequence S(r) = (s 1 (r), s 2 (r), s 3 (r), . . . , s z (r)) records the colors of the nodes in round r. All agents are divided into k sets V c j (r)(j = 1, 2, 3, . . . , k) according to their color in round r. For example, if the color of one node v i is c j in round r, s i (r) = c j , this node belongs to set V c j (r). Here, z = |V | = |S|, m = |E| and k = |C| express the numbers of nodes, edges, and colors in the networked color coordination game, respectively. In the model, edges that connect nodes with the same color are considered conflicts, while other edges are considered conflict-free. As noted, agents act using local information in the game. Specifically, in this model, agents can see only the colors of neighbors with whom they share the same edge in addition to their own color, which is also called the ''blind'' phenomenon.
Based on social network characteristics, we build the model network according to scale-free networks [33] , namely, the network structure is created from the beginning by randomly attaching new nodes (each with l links) to existing nodes based on the degree of existing nodes [12] . The topology of networks is fixed during the whole color coordination game. In our network, the adjacency index is
Before the game, we colorize each node by randomly selecting a color with a uniform distribution in the set C. For example, we randomly select one color c x to colorize one node v i , that is,
During the game process, each agent acts simultaneously according to action rules, which are introduced in Section III, in each round. For example, the color of one node v i is c x in round r, and then this node changes its color to c y based on the action rules in round r + 1. This process is
When the game is finished, the condition that should be met is the existence of no conflicts in the network. Specifically, any two nodes that share the same edge have different colors. This condition is
As the condition of the game finishing, it describes the objective of group coordination that achieves the maximum collective interest of the group, which is characterized as the state in which there is no conflict in the game. In addition, the rounds of the game are considered as a problem-solving evaluation index, and we set an upper limit u for the rounds of the game in our experiment.
III. THE ACTION RULES FOR AGENTS
To mimic the individuals in real-life group coordination, we formulate the action rules for conventional agents and q-bots.
A. THE CONVENTIONAL AGENTS ACTION RULE
We formulate the rule for conventional agents as follows. For one conventional agent connected with greater than or equal to one conflict edge in round r, this agent randomly selects from the whole color set if the random number is less than the random parameter of conventional agents and the colors of its neighbors occupy all color in set C; otherwise, the agent randomly selects from the set including the color not occupied by its neighbors. This agent will not change its color if it is connected without conflict edges.
Algorithm 1 The Conventional Agent Action Rule
else 5 :
end if 7: s i (r + 1) ∈ U (C ) 8: else 9: s i (r + 1) = s i (r) 10 : end if Algorithm 1 shows the above-mentioned conventional agent action rule, where set N v i includes the neighbors of one node v i and v i , P c ∈ U [0, 1] represents a random number P c generated with a uniform distribution in the interval [0, 1], the constant P represents the random parameter of conventional agents (characterized by the uncertainty of individuals in a practical problem), set V N v i c j (r) denotes nodes colorized with c j that belong to set N v i and U (C ) denotes a randomly selected color with a uniform distribution in set C . By establishing this rule, we consider the action of the individual in reality, such as the individual uncertainty and the individual expectation of coordinating with neighbors.
When the condition meets the requirement of P c ∈ U [0, 1] ≤ P, Fig. 1 Fig. 1(a) , the center node changes its color to purple for the next round because it meets the conditions that V N v i c j (r) = ∅(c j = green, orange) and V N v i c j (r) = ∅(c j = purple) for the current round. In Fig. 1(b) , the center node changes to the other color generated with a uniform distribution of the set C = {purple, green, orange} for the next round because the node meets the condition that V N v i c j (r) = ∅(c j = green, orange, purple) for the current round.
In addition, conflicts are classified as resolvable and unresolvable conflicts based on this rule [12] . When the condition meets the requirement of P c ∈ U [0, 1] ≤ P, the resolvable conflicts can be eliminated when either node selects from the set composed of the color not occupied by neighbors, but the unresolvable conflicts cannot. Figure. Fig. 1(c) , the 2 center nodes change their color to purple and orange based on this rule for the next round. By doing so, this conflict is eliminated; therefore, it is considered a resolvable conflict. In Fig. 1(d) , the 2 center nodes change their color to purple based on this rule for the next round. However, this conflict sinks into infinite loop; therefore, it is considered an unresolvable conflict. In the following experiments, conflicts are regarded as unsolvable conflicts when two agents have only one color to select according to conventional agent rules; otherwise, they are regarded as resolvable conflicts.
B. THE LEARNING AGENT ACTION RULE
To improve the group coordination problem, we introduce q-bots into the color coordination game in exchange for the same number of conventional agents. We encode q-bots with Q-learning, which is a model-free reinforcement learning algorithm [34] . The Q-learning algorithm includes an agent, a set of states W , a set of actions A, a reward b and a table T that records the expected reward of an action taken in a given state. The core algorithm is as following:
where T denotes the updated table, b r is the reward received when moving from state w r to state w r+1 , α is the learning rate and γ is the discount factor. To select an optimal action for any given state, (5) is used to iteratively update T during the learning process.
In our model, we use a multi-agent Q-learning method [34] , [35] , which exchanges h q-bots for the same number of conventional agents in our model. One q-bot located at node v i corresponds to one table T v i . For multi-agent Q-learning, the state of one q-bot is a sorted sequence S N v i (r) that records the color of the q-bot and its neighbors. This state records the location information of neighbors corresponding to the q-bot and the color information of neighbors. The action set of one q-bot is set C, which denotes the colors that can be selected by the q-bots. When the network composed of one q-bot and its neighbors is conflict-free, the corresponding reward b equals 1; otherwise, it equals 0. end if 12: else 13: s i (r + 1) = s i (r) 14: end if Based on the multi-agent Q-learning method, q-bots act with a greedy strategy [36] , and we set the greedy parameter (ε). We clarify the action rules of the q-bots as follows. One q-bot q i connected with greater than or equal to one conflict edge selects the maximum expected reward of a color in a given state if the random number is greater than ε; otherwise, it selects based on the conventional agent action rule. This q-bot does not change its color if it is not connected with a conflict edge. Algorithm 2 shows these action rules. Because each agent acts simultaneously according to action rules, we can get the next state of one q-bot and update the corresponding table T v i after all agents choose actions.
Algorithm 2 The Learning Agent Action Rule
Independently of the above-mentioned ε, we also manipulate the q-bot network location, including its random, central and peripheral attributes. A peripheral location means that VOLUME 7, 2019 q-bots are assigned to locations that have the lowest network degree. Likewise, a central location means that q-bots are assigned to a location with the largest network degree. A random location means that q-bots are randomly assigned to the network.
IV. CASE STUDY
To eliminate the barriers of group coordination, we introduce q-bots into the networked color coordination game and perform a simulation experiment. In the experiment, where the number of edges added each time during building a network l = 2, the number of colors k = 3 (chromatic number representing the minimum number of colors which is necessary to color the networks to meet the conflict-free condition, because there are no four interconnected nodes in the model network constructed with l = 2), the random parameter of conventional agents P = 0.1, the discount factor γ = 0.9 and the learning rate α = 0.5. The networks constructed in the following experiment are globally solvable. First, we analyze the key cause of the group coordination problem and evaluate the effectiveness of q-bots in solving this problem. Then, we analyze the effect of key parameters on q-bots in the solution. Finally, we investigate the mechanism of q-bots in depth to solve this problem, which includes the mode of q-bots acting on coordination networks and conflict relationships.
A. EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS OF LEARNING AGENTS
In this experiment, by contrasting the performance with and without q-bots in one game, we find the key cause of the group coordination problem and present a hypothesis that q-bots can effectively solve the group coordination problem. Additionally, we give a simple example to illustrate the advantages of q-bots. Then, by contrasting the performance of the network with and without q-bots in 10 different networks with 1000 nodes, we validate this hypothesis. The q-bots are assigned to center locations, and ε = 0.1 in this section. The experimental results are presented in Fig. 2 .
As shown in Fig. 2(a) , for the game without q-bots, although conventional agents aim to eliminate all conflicts based on the rule, most of the conflicts remain in the network, and the game rounds are too long. Therefore, we consider the key cause of the group coordination problem as being that conventional agents cannot achieve the collective goal by eliminating only their local conflicts individually, called the ''blind'' phenomenon. In contrast, for the game with q-bots, the game rounds are much shorter, and there are considerably fewer conflicts. Based on the above analysis, we hypothesize that q-bots can effectively solve the group coordination problem.
Compared with conventional agents, the advantage of q-bots is that they can choose the action with the highest reward according to the learning information, so that the games with q-bots can achieve a conflict-free state with a higher probability, and the disadvantage of learning agents is that iterative learning takes time. To prove this point, we present an example for illustration in Fig. 2(b) . Games without q-bots always get stuck into an infinite loop of unresolvable conflicts. By contrast, games with q-bots can help to avoid previous pitfall and easily achieve a conflict-free state because they can induce other nodes to break the infinite loop of unsolvable conflicts by choosing the color with the highest reward obtained from iterative learning.
To validate the above-mentioned hypothesis, we perform an experiment and show the result in Fig. 2(c) . Because games without q-bots often sink into an infinite loop of unresolvable conflicts, games without q-bots rarely complete within the upper limit, and the number of rounds in games without q-bots does not change with increasing generations. In contrast, the number of rounds in games with q-bots decreases with increasing generations, and more and more games complete within the upper limit. This result supports our hypothesis that q-bots help to improve the group coordination problem.
B. ANALYSIS OF KEY LEARNING AGENT PARAMETERS
There are many learning agent parameters, but our model is based on networks, and q-bots are based on the learning algorithm; therefore, we consider only the key parameters, including network location and ε. In this section, we manipulate the q-bot network location and ε to evaluate 10 conditions, including 1 control condition without q-bots and 9 condition combinations including 3 types of network locations (random, central and peripheral) and 3 levels of ε (0.1, 0.3 and 0.5). Figure. 3 shows the results of this experiment as the relationship between rounds and the survival proportion in 20 games under the 10 conditions. With decreasing ε, the survival proportion obviously decreases, which indicates that q-bots with a smaller ε solve the group coordination problem better. There is a clear distinction between the three types of network locations. The central location case is the best, and the peripheral location case is the worst. The random location case lies between them. The q-bots with central locations have many more neighbors than those with the other two types of locations; therefore, we assume that q-bots act on coordination networks by affecting not only individuals to whom they are connected directly but also other individuals. This assumption is proven in Section IV-C. Additionally, the performance of the game with q-bots with different ε levels and locations is either better or worse. For example, when q-bots act with ε = 0.1 and are placed in central location, games have the lowest proportion of survival in 20 games, and q-bots improving the game by more than 80%. This result supports our conclusion in Section IV-A that q-bots effectively solve the group coordination problem. However, when q-bots act with ε = 0.5 and are placed in a peripheral location, games have the maximum survival proportion, which demonstrate q-bots even play a negative role. Therefore, ε and location are vital to q-bots in solving group coordination. By properly selecting the parameters, q-bots can solve the problem with the best effect. Otherwise, q-bots play a negative role in group coordination. . The blue error bar shows the case without q-bots, and the red error bar shows the case with q-bots.
C. ACTION MECHANISM OF LEARNING AGENTS ON COORDINATION NETWORKS
To study the way q-bots act on group coordination in depth, we carry out an experiment to analyze the action mode of q-bots acting on coordination networks. We count the number of node color changes for every 100 generations in the process of iterative learning and normalize these data by dividing their maximum. The processed data show the degree of color change in the nodes. In this section, q-bots are placed in a central location, and the results are shown in Fig. 4 .
For games without q-bots, there is no clear distinction between the different intervals of generations, and the degree of color change is too high. For cases with q-bots, the degree of color change decreases with decreasing ε. This result matches the result in Section IV-B indicating that q-bots with smaller ε levels influence nodes more strongly. The degree of color change in the nodes decreases with the process of learning, but there is no clear distinction between the generation of intervals [100, 200] and [200, 300] , which shows that the effect of the q-bots on group coordination will be saturated with the process of learning.
It is apparent that q-bots influence their neighbors. However, if the q-bot cannot influence other nodes, the group coordination with q-bots has almost no improvement. Therefore, we are more confident in the assumption given in Section IV-B. By comparing the results of games with and without q-bots, we find that the degree of color change for nodes connected with q-bots and other nodes decreases with the decrement of ε levels, but the degree of decrease for nodes connected with q-bots is obviously higher than that for other nodes with the decrement of ε levels. Therefore, we validate the assumption mentioned in Section IV-B stating that q-bots have a direct effect on the neighbor individuals and an indirect effect on the non-neighbor individuals to act on the coordination network, but ''information'' is lost in the dissemination. Thus, q-bots act on the coordination network. 
D. ACTION MECHANISM OF LEARNING AGENTS ON CONFLICT RELATIONSHIPS
To study the way q-bots act on group coordination in depth, we carry out an experiment to analyze the action mode of q-bots acting on conflict relationships among individuals. We propose the average rounds index for solving conflicts. For a conflict with one edge in one game, the definition of the average rounds required for solving conflict is
where CL i shows the number of rounds in which edge e i sinks into this type of conflict and CN i shows the number of intervals in which edge e i sinks into this type of conflict. For many edges or many games, we simply weight the mean of this index. This index is used to measure the efficiency of conflict solving. Based on this index, we analyze the action mode of q-bots acting on conflict edges in 10 different networks with 1000 nodes. In this section, q-bots are placed in a central location, and edges are classified as edges connected to q-bots and edges not connected to q-bots based on their relationship with q-bots. Figure. 5 shows the results of this experiment. For games without q-bots, there is no clear distinction in the average rounds required for solving conflict with increasing generations. For games with q-bots, the average rounds required for solving conflict decreases with increasing generations. The q-bots with a smaller ε level have better performance. Additionally, the improvement of this index for edges connected to q-bots is obviously higher than that for edges not connected to q-bots, which supports the results that q-bots solve the problem of coordination effectively and have an effect on all individuals (the effect on neighbors is larger than that on non-neighbors) in the above experiment.
In addition, we find that the improvement magnitude of unresolvable conflicts is much higher than that of resolvable conflicts in games with q-bots. Therefore, we ignore the improvement of resolvable conflicts. By contrasting the games with and without q-bots, we conclude that q-bots eliminate the conflicts that cannot be solved by individuals. This result matches the example in Fig.2 (b) . Thus, q-bots act on the conflict relationship among individuals in group coordination.
V. CONCLUSION
Group coordination often uses social networks, but improving group coordination represents a challenging and fascinating problem. In the coordination process, individuals often have difficulty reaching the collective objective because of the personal interest and ''blind'' phenomenon in the social networks. To satisfy the needs of society and solve the group coordination problem, we propose a solution on the basis of artificial intelligence. We use a networked color coordination game model to characterize group coordination and introduce q-bots into this model. The learning agent function for solving the group coordination problem is as follows.
1) The group coordination problems caused by individuals unable to reach the collective objective by eliminating only their local conflicts from an individual standpoint are improved by q-bots. 2) By properly selecting the ε and network location, q-bots drastically improve group coordination. The q-bots acting with low levels of ε and placed in central locations improve the group coordination by more than 80%.
3) In acting on the coordination network, q-bots work by having not only a direct effect on neighbor individuals but also an indirect effect on non-neighbor individuals.
To act on the conflict relationship, q-bots eliminate conflicts that cannot be solved by an individual. In the above two ways, q-bots improve the group coordination problem to help groups achieve collective interests. As a result, the finding in this paper provides q-bots to improve group coordination by solving the sub-optimization problem arising from the individual ''blind'' phenomenon. For example, we set q-bots in positions (decision makers) that have the most neighbors in practice, which can improve the auxiliary function and provide certain decisionmaking support. However, beyond this point, this work on group coordination applies not only to human populations but also to groups composed solely of robots attempting to coordinate their actions [12] . From a broad perspective, this work can be applied in more realistic or complex coordination problems, such as those involving military robots or autonomous moving vehicles. The code that support the findings of this study are available from GitHub (http://github.com/JingtaoQi/color-game).
Although this paper proves our idea, we consider only some basic factors, including the ε level and network location of the learning agents [37] . Further work is required, including considering dynamic networks in which the connections between nodes may change [38] , the effect of historical information on individual decision making [39] , ''prosocial preferences'' in which individuals imitate the majority behavior [40] , the effect of the social environment on individual decision making [41] , [42] and the effect of individual reputations on cooperative behaviors (individuals can maximize their reputation by cooperating with surrounding high-reputation individuals) [43] , [44] . Furthermore, because of the particularity of group coordination in society, how to control complex group coordination is also a promising research topic.
